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Abstract: We revisit resource curse theory by providing empirical evidence for the effects of 
natural resource on the subjective wellbeing. Using cross-sectional model based on a global 
sample of 149 countries, we highlight that resources rents tend to reduce happiness but this 
effect differs according to (i) the political system and the level of development, (ii) the types 
and the measures of natural resources and (iii) the scale of happiness. Specifically, the negative 
effect of natural resources on happiness tends to be amplified in developing and weak 
democracy countries. Furthermore, the disaggregation of natural resource rents show that while 
oil rents and natural gas rent have a significant negative effect, forest, coal and mineral rents do 
not. However, after using the quantile regression approach, we find that these effects vary at 
different intervals throughout the happiness distribution. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the role of natural resources in economic growth has been a topic of large 
debate in the literature. Many studies have tried to understand the reasons why resource-rich 
countries suffer from economic turmoil, and how these disorders jeopardize their growth 
compared to others. Indeed, since the pioneering work of Krugman (1987) and Corden (1984), 
contributions to understand the role of the abundance of natural resources in economic 
development have revealed that the macroeconomic difficulties of countries abundant in natural 
resources hamper their economic growth. However, this result highlighted by Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1999 and 2001) and qualified as the natural resources curse since Auty (1993), has been 
the subject of much controversy in the literature (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Sala-i-Martin et 
al, 2000; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Lederman and Maloney, 2003, 2007; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003; Wright and Czelusta, 2004 and Arezki and Van Der Ploeg, 2007). 
The theory of the natural resources curse has evolved over time. This curse is explained either by 
the Dutch disease theory (Corden and Neavy, 1982; Corden, 1984; van Wijnbergen, 1984a, 1984b), the 
institutional theory (Mehlum et al., 2006; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; Frankel, 2010; de Medeiros Costa 
et al., 2013; Eregha and Mesagan, 2016), the staples theory of economic growth (Watkins, 1963) and 
the theory of rent curse (Tollison, 1982; Davis and Tilton, 2005; Krueger, 1974; Auty, 2015). We can 
go back to Smith (1812) who demonstrated that natural resources are a blessing for the 
economy, in that it constitutes a source of income in foreign currency in particular. This positive 
relationship was contradicted more than a hundred and fifty years later by Corden and Navy 
(1982) when they developed the thesis of the Dutch disease. Six years later, Gelb (1988), based 
on a case study, established the thesis of the natural resource curse. However, Auty (1993) is 
attributed the authorship of the natural resource curse concept in his seminal work Sustaining 
Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. Two years later, this thesis 
was empirically highlighted by Sachs and Warner (1995), clearly demonstrating the negative 
effect of natural resources on economic growth. The last major articulation of this theory is the 
work of Gylfason (2001), who established the link between dependence on natural resources 
and some determinants of economic growth. 
Empirically, the debate on the effects of natural resources on development generally led to a 
paradox, which of the natural resources curse. In other words, resources rich countries would 
find it difficult to develop, due to the crowding-out effect that these resources create for other 
sectors of the economy. Economically, the authorship of this concept returns as said earlier to 
Auty (1993), even if this theory has not been generalized to all countries 1. Therefore, the 
exploitation of natural capital which should lead to the improvement of the living conditions of 
the population, sometimes lead to a drop in economic development through some channels as 
volatility in commodity prices (Davis and Tilton, 2008; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2017), 
economic mismanagement (Iimi, 2007) and corruption (Bhattacharyya anf Hodler, 2010). 
However, it should be noted after Lederman and Maloney (2003) that the results of Auty and 
Warhurst (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999 and 2001) could be sensitive to the 
empirical technique and the indicators of abundance in natural resources used. By changing 
econometric methods, control variables and measures of resource abundance, the authors find 
a positive relationship with long-term growth. This result is corroborated by Arezki and Van 
Der Ploeg (2007) who showed that the empirical evidence of the resource curse is biased 
                                                             
1See for example among others Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Alexeev and Conrad (2009), Cavalcanti et al. 
(2011), Boyce and Emery (2011), Haber and Menaldo (2011), Ross (2012), James (2015). 
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because it does not take into account endogenous parameters such as the quality of institutions 
and the degree of economic integration.  
In the same way, Wright and Czelusta (2004) argued that the results of Sachs and Warner are 
influenced by the exceptional economic shocks that characterized the 1970s and which are not 
representative of long-term growth trends. Furthermore, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2000) used a 
Bayesian inference method with around thirty variables, and find a positive relationship of the 
mining sector on growth among other variables. Santos (2018) concluded that relationship 
between natural resources and development seems to be sensitive to the time horizon. Most 
recently, Marques and Silva Pires (2019) demonstrated in the short run that, natural gas 
abundance promotes economic growth and in the long run, while natural gas dependence has 
no impact on economic growth. In addition to the effect on economic growth widely 
documented in the literature, the resource curse is also associated with social conflicts (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Di John, 2007; Fearon, 2005; Le Billon, 2003 and 2005; Ross, 2001). 
Furthermore, the slowness in political changes is another negative consequence of the natural 
resources curse, with a significant impact on the perpetration of autocratic political regimes, 
favorable to an opaque management of the profits derived from natural resources (Auty, 2001).  
However, several works have gone beyond the traditional impact of the natural resource curse 
on economic growth and have focused on its social externalities. In this profusion, we can cite 
the works of Karl (1997) and Ross (2001), showing that natural resource appears to be strongly 
correlated with poverty (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001). In the same way, Segal (2011) highlighted 
the role of resource dividend and claims that if resource-rich developing countries implemented 
it, world poverty would decrease significantly. This conclusion was reinforced by Mosley 
(2017) and Apergis and Katsaiti (2018). In addition, Bulte et al. (2005) and Makhlouf et al. 
(2017) found that resources rents and the fluctuations of commodity prices are associated with 
a high infant mortality rate. Daniele (2011) indicated the existence of a negative correlation 
between metals and minerals export and human development. Similarly, Behubudi et al. (2010) 
and Carmignani and Avom (2010) found that dependence and abundance on natural resources 
have a negative impact on health and human capital although the effect depends on the degree 
of wealth on resources. Furthermore, Studies have also highlighted the role of natural resources 
on the environment (Gregoire and Valentine, 2007; Kula, 2012), inequality (Auty, 1994; Fields, 
1989) and education Spending (Cockx and Francken, 2016).  
Regarding the effect mainly on the well-being of the population, to our knowledge, the only 
reference that examine a direct link between resource rents and happiness is that of Ali et al. 
(2020). The authors explore the links between changes in happiness across countries and 
dependence on natural resources and finds that oil rents are negatively linked to improved 
happiness over time. This paper intends to fill this gap and make a major contribution to the 
literature by providing empirical proof of different measures effects of natural resources on the 
subjective well-being. Thus, in the continuity of all these works mentioned above, and starting 
from a sample of worldwide countries, we revisit the curse of natural resources by focusing on 
its consequences on happiness. 
The interest of this study can be perceived at least at five levels. First of all, it contributes both 
to empirical literature on the determinants of happiness and the curse of natural resources. 
Indeed, our overall empirical results confirmed the existence of a resource curse through the 
channel of happiness. Second, unlike the existing literature on the resource dependence which 
focus on specific resource like oil, this paper uses the total measure of natural resource rents as 
well as all the 5 disaggregated indicators distinguished by the World Bank (oil, gas, mineral, 
coal and forest) and determine their marginal link with happiness. In this perspective, our results 
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revealed that total rents negatively influence happiness and particularly those derived from oil 
and gas. Third, we take into account the likely heterogeneity between countries that may exist 
when considering a large worldwide sample like ours, by studying the effects in different 
sample groups. We found that the negative effect of natural resources on happiness is amplified 
in developing and weak democracy countries. Fourth, this study goes beyond the average effect 
as did the previous studies and uses a quantile approach in order to assess the effect of natural 
resources on the extent of happiness. Thus, our results have shown that these effects vary at 
different intervals throughout the happiness distribution. Finally, this article suggests some 
recommendations for economic policies that can help better allocate resource rents in order to 
improve the well-being of the population. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and data. 
Section 3 presents and analyses the results. Section 4 tests their robustness and section 5 
concludes. 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1 Empirical model and variables 
In order to test the effect of resources rents on happiness, we follow earlier work of Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), Isham et al. (2005) and Bulte et al. (2005), in their work on the effect of 
resource abundance on economic growth and institutions. We specify the following equation: 𝐿𝐿𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖′𝛽 + 𝛾𝑅𝑅𝑖 + 𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (1) 
Where 𝜀𝑖 is the residual term, 𝑑𝑖 is the regional dummies, and 𝑖 specifies the country.  
The dependent variable 𝐿𝐿𝑖 is the subjective well-being measured by the life ladder index 
(Easterlin, 2004; Helliwell et al., 2018). This index come from the World Happiness Database 
which ranks 156 countries, measured as the level of happiness perception of their citizens. It is 
obtained by inviting respondents to think of their lives as a ladder, with the worst possible life 
for them as 0, and the best possible life as 10. 
The independent variable of interest 𝑅𝑅𝑖 measures the total of resource rents as a percentage of 
GDP. In the literature of resource curse, the most common variables used to measure resources 
wealth are the percentage of exports of natural resources in total exports (Dietz et al., 2007), 
and the percentage of exports of natural resources in GDP (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Leite and 
Weidmann, 1999; Boschini et al., 2013). However, some authors have shown that studies on 
the resource curse should measure the consequences on behaviors that are caused by resource 
rent rather than those caused by the distortion of the structure of exportation that results from 
resource exploitation. From this perspective, Ebeke et al. (2015) argue that resource rents 
variable, by measuring the instantaneous real macroeconomic contribution of the resources 
(through redistribution via government spending, private sector consumption, etc.), appears the 
most relevant proxy to use as it affects directly households and individuals' utility functions 
through many channels. 
The vector 𝑋 gathers the controls variables represented by the potentials determinants of 
subjective well-being as suggested by the literature. This includes GDP per capital as proxy of 
the economic development, inflation rate, unemployment rate, population growth, life 
expectancy at birth as proxy of health and the human capital index as a proxy of education. 
According to Easterlin, (2001), Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Frey (2018), people with higher 
income unambiguously consider themselves to be more satisfied with their lives than persons 
with low income. Di Tella et al. (2001), Frey and Stutzer (2002) show that people appear to be 
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happier when inflation and unemployment are low. Cuñado and De Gracia (2012) and Chen 
(2012) show that education leads to a better quality of life, which results from relative higher 
income and stable job status. Helliwell et al. (2018) found that countries with higher healthy 
life expectancy at birth have also been documented to be associated with higher level of 
happiness. We add to these variables, regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and 
North Africa, South Asia, North America, Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Latin 
America and Caribbean) for controlling regional variability in the perception of happiness. 
2.2 Estimation technique and data description 
Based on a cross-sectional perspective, the preliminary results of the coefficient of interest 𝛾 is 
obtained with the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator with a full set of regional dummies, 
after controlling for normality, heteroskedasticity, multicolinearity and omitted variables (see 
Tables A3 in appendix). We also introduce into the regression, some control variables in order 
to limit the bias of variables omission. Subsequently, we appreciate the robustness of our results 
by opting for limited dependent approach and for a non-parametric econometric method based 
on quantile regressions (QR). 
Table 1: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definitions Sources Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Happiness 
index 
Subjective well-being obtained by inviting respondents to think of their 
lives as a ladder, with the worst possible life for them as 0, and the best 
possible life as 10. 
WHR 
(2017) 
149 5.37 1.14 2.90 7.63 
Total natural 
resources 
rents 
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal 
rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. 
WHR 
(2017) 
148 7.71 9.72 0.00 45.27 
Oil rents Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at 
world prices and total costs of production. 
WDI 
(2019) 
136 6.24 10.78 0.00 44.84 
Gas rents Natural gas rents are the difference between the value of natural gas 
production at world prices and total costs of production. 
WDI 
(2019) 
138 0.56 1.32 0.00 10.69 
Forest rents Forest rents are round wood harvest times the product of average prices 
and a region-specific rental rate. 
WDI 
(2019) 
147 2.23 3.87 0.00 20.15 
Coal rents Coal rents are the difference between the value of both hard and soft coal 
production at world prices and their total costs of production. 
WDI 
(2019) 
129 43.41 33.80 10.82 264.84 
Mineral 
rents 
Mineral rents are the difference between the value of production for a 
stock of minerals at world prices and their total costs of production. 
WDI 
(2019) 
125 1.16 2.42 0.00 15.64 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. WDI 
(2019) 
147 8.27 1.50 5.54 11.10 
Health Life expectancy at birth. WDI 
(2019) 
149 63.75 10.22 40.50 77.91 
Unemploym
ent 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work 
but available for and seeking employment. 
ILOSTAT 
(2019) 
148 7.85 5.52 0.82 30.99 
Population 
growth 
Exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t. WDI 
(2019) 
147 3.90 1.45 0.27 8.60 
Education Human capital index measured by the average years of schooling in the 
population. 
PWT 9.1 129 2.11 0.67 1.06 3.52 
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified 
intervals such as yearly. 
WDI 
(2019) 
144 31.93 78.91 1.07 675.85 
Polity IV Level of democratization: -10 ⩽ Autocracy <6 ; 6 ⩽ Democracy ⩽10 CSP 
(2017) 
141 4.52 5.93 -10 10 
Note: authors’ construction. WHD, WDI, PWT and ILOSTAT respectively designates World Happiness Database, world Development 
Indicators, Penn World Table and Institute of Labor Statistics. 
Our sample covers 149 cross-countries2 depending on the data availability on the happiness 
index as well as those related to resources rents. The complete list of study countries is presented 
in the appendix (see Table A1). The definition, sources and main characteristics of all the data 
are presented in Table 1. 
                                                             
2
 This number can change depending on the estimation technique, the sample and the variables selected. 
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The study of the first two moments of our variables makes it possible to draw two major 
conclusions. First, the dependent variable is relatively less dispersed with regard to the 
proportionality between its standard deviation and its mean. Thus, the level of happiness would 
therefore be relatively grouped around its average of 5.37. Second, the variable of interest as 
well as its various components all seem to be over-dispersed, which augurs for volatility in the 
profits from the export of natural resources. This argument consolidates previous research 
explaining natural resources curse, which states that, the negative effect of natural resources on 
GDP is generally faster and more important. For the rest of the variables, the GDP per capita, 
health condition (life expectancy at birth), unemployment, population growth and education are 
relatively stable, while inflation and democracy are relatively volatile. 
3. Results and discussion 
We discuss first the results of our basic specification, then those of some sensitivity tests. 
3.1 Preliminary evidence 
Figure 1 provides a visual relationship between total resource rents and subjective well-being 
from our sample. Overall and as evidenced by the correlation matrix (see Table A2 in appendix), 
we observe from this graph a negative correlation between the total rent of natural resources 
and the measure of happiness. In other words, resources rents tend to reduce happiness in our 
sample on average. Countries with high resource rent level experiment a resource curse, due to 
the low diversification and the poor quality of institutions. 
Figure 1: Correlation between total resources rents and happiness 
 
Source: authors’ construction using data of WDI and WHD. 
Table 2 presents the results of the model estimations. While column 1 presents the results of 
the specific marginal effect of total natural resource rents on happiness, columns 2 and 3 present 
the results when the model is augmented by the determinants of happiness and sub-regional 
dummies. For all these specifications, we find a 1 % statistically significant and negative effect 
of natural resource rents on happiness. These results go in the same direction as those of the 
literature which shows the negative effect of natural resources on certain well-being variables 
such as Human Development Index (Carmignani and Avom, 2010; Daniele, 2010) and poverty 
(Segal, 2011). The main explanation for this result is undoubtedly the poor allocation of the 
rents derived from these resources due to the bad quality of institutions (Mehlum et al., 2006; 
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Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; de Medeiros Costa et al., 2013). Indeed, resource rents can in 
principle, be associated with greater happiness gains if income is redistributed equitably and 
invested in activities that improve well-being, such as social public investment projects. 
Conversely, if these are based on rent seeking rather than expected returns (Brollo et al. 2013), 
general dissatisfaction should increase sharply.  
The control variables highlight the expected signs. The GDP per capita is positively associated 
with well-being. According to population growth, results validate the well-known Malthusian 
hypothesis explaining the imbalance between the growth of the resources necessary for 
determining well-being and population growth. 
Table 2: Baseline results 
 
Dependent variable: Life ladder 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Total natural resources rents -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.008)    
GDP per capita 
 
0.450*** 0.486*** 
  
(0.066) (0.069)    
Population growth 
 
-0.108*** -0.095**  
  
(0.036) (0.041)    
Inflation 
 
-0.000 -0.000    
  
(0.001) (0.001)    
Health 
 
0.036*** 0.020    
  
(0.013) (0.015)    
Unemployment 
 
-0.058*** -0.055*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011)    
Education 
 
-0.074 0.231    
  
(0.148) (0.157)    
Sub-regional dummies No No Yes 
Observations 148 123 123 
R-squared 0.083 0.799 0.828    
Note: Authors' estimates. Results based on OLS regressions of equation (1). Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 
0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010. 
3.2 What important are the level of development and democratization? 
We take into account the heterogeneity between countries by grouping our sample according to 
political and economic specificities. To do so, we first follow Marshall and Jagger (2009) and 
distinguish between autocratic countries (countries with Polity IV index is between -10 and 6) 
and relatively democratic countries (countries with Polity IV index between 6 and 10). 
Thereafter we use the World Bank classification of countries by level of development and 
distinguish two other group of countries, namely developed (upper middle income and high 
income) and developing countries (low income and lower middle income). Results are 
summarized in Table 3.  
According to our results, the negative effect of total natural resource rents on happiness in 
countries with weak democracy is greater than that observed in democratic countries. Likewise, 
regarding the level of development, we find that the resources curse tends to be amplified in 
developing countries compared to develop ones. Overall, these results show that the natural 
resource curse is a serious problem worldwide, but its extent depends on the political system 
and the level of development across countries. Several arguments can be put forward to support 
these results. First, the limited democratic accountability typically found in authoritarian, 
resource-rich countries (Tsui, 2011). Similarly, a general feeling of dissatisfaction can also 
result from poor governance (characteristic of many resource-rich economies). Indeed, oil-rich 
countries are often characterized by a weak rule of law and a high risk of expropriation, failed 
bureaucracies and endemic corruption (see Kolstad and Wiig 2009), these in addition to power 
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struggles and tensions between different interest groups (see Baggio and Papyrakis 2010; 
Hodler 2006). 
Table 3: Resources rents and happiness in different sample 
 
Dependent variable: life ladder 
 Global 
sample 
Democracy level Income level 
 
Autocracy 
countries 
Democracy 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
Total natural resources rents -0.025*** -0.028* -0.021* -0.016* -0.051*** 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)    
GDP per capita 0.486*** 0.440*** 0.545*** 0.484*** 0.482*** 
 
(0.069) (0.129) (0.083) (0.096) (0.148)    
Population growth -0.095** -0.202*** -0.040 -0.154*** -0.100    
 
(0.041) (0.071) (0.058) (0.044) (0.089)    
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.000    
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Health 0.020 0.022 0.004 0.035 0.007    
 
(0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.029) (0.031)    
Unemployment -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.042*** -0.045*** 
 
(0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)    
Education 0.231 0.319 0.195 0.238 0.464    
 
(0.157) (0.430) (0.175) (0.177) (0.307)    
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 123 37 86 68 54 
R-squared 0.828 0.769 0.841 0.808 0.779    
Note: Authors' estimates. Results based on OLS regressions of equation (1). Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 
0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010. 
Furthermore, on average in the world, the resource-rich countries are mainly developing 
countries such as sub-Saharan African countries and are characterized by their poor quality of 
institutions. In fact, the rents benefits are not always well distributed and do not allow the 
improvement of the quality of life of the population. As Arezki and Gylfason (2013) have 
shown, higher resource rents lead to more corruption and the effect is significantly stronger in 
less democratic countries. Much more, the inability of many resource-rich countries to raise 
living standards as well as macroeconomic volatility resulting from the fluctuation of resource 
prices (see van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009) can also be considered as another factor that 
would justify the negative effect of natural resources on happiness. 
3.3 Differential effects on the type of natural resources 
We check if the effect of resources rents on happiness may differ depending on the types of 
natural resources. To this end, we previously highlighted in Figure 2 the correlation between 
rents and happiness resources. We observe that the correlation varies according to the nature of 
the resources. Specifically, we detect negative correlations concerning the oil, mineral and 
forest rents; a positive correlation for coal rent and an ambiguous correlation for natural gas 
rent. 
These correlations are confirmed in our estimations after considering in turn as variables of 
interest these different measurements of natural resources (see Table 4). However, while the 
coefficients of these variables have consistent signs in the sense of the previously observed 
correlations, only the coefficients associated with oil and natural gas rents are statistically 
significant. These results suggest that the negative effects of total natural resources rents are 
mainly driven by those of oil and natural gas. These results corroborate those of Ali et al. (2020) 
who show that oil rents are negatively correlate to human welfare over time, and those of 
Daniele (2011) who claimed that mineral resource rents reduce Human Development Index (a 
composite development index of life expectancy, education and GDP per capita).  
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Figure 2: Correlation between disaggregated resources rents and happiness 
 
Source: Authors’ construction using data of WDI and WHD. 
Table 4: Disaggregated resources rents and happiness 
 
Dependent variable: life ladder 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total natural resources rents -0.022*** 
    
             
 
(0.006) 
    
             
Oil rents  
 
-0.024*** 
   
             
  
(0.006) 
   
             
Forest rents  
  
-0.011 
  
             
   
(0.019) 
  
             
Mineral rents  
   
-0.002               
    
(0.003)               
Coal rents 
    
0.002              
     
(0.020)              
Natural gas rents  
     
-0.147*   
      
(0.075)    
GDP per capita 0.450*** 0.498*** 0.376*** 0.462*** 0.391*** 0.383*** 
 
(0.066) (0.073) (0.066) (0.082) (0.074) (0.062)    
Population growth -0.108*** -0.103** -0.076** -0.077 -0.065* -0.120**  
 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.034) (0.050) (0.038) (0.045)    
Inflation -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001    
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Health 0.036*** 0.026* 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.027*   
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)    
Unemployment -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.068*** -0.052*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)    
Education -0.074 -0.039 0.022 -0.027 -0.085 0.190    
 
(0.148) (0.178) (0.150) (0.182) (0.180) (0.161)    
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 123 80 123 107 105 74 
R-squared 0.799 0.796 0.782 0.778 0.776 0.784    
Note: Authors' estimates. Results based on OLS regressions of equation (1). Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 
0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010. 
 
ISL
SGP
HKGLBN
CHE
MUS
LUX
JPN
BEL
ITA
FRA
CYP
ES
ISR
SV
IRL
GRC
PAN
MDA
D UAUT
P T
SVK
LKA
HUN
SWE
TUR
DNK
LTU
URY
MNE
FI
CZE
LV
N D
BGD
JOR
GEO
H V
AFG
GBR
TJK
POL
PAKSRB
XKX
BLZ
DOM
SA
LVA
HTI
EST
TM
ARM
IH
THA
BLR
NZL
BGRNPL
MAR
PRYPHL
ROUNIC
BRAA G
SEN
HND
IND
CRI
BWA
CAN
KEN
KGZ
S NUKR
NAMALBH
COL
AUS
JAM
EX
CIV
MDG
BTN
ZAF
NOR
LSO
CHN
ZWE
TUNMLI
PERBOL
BEN
V MCMR
BHR
TZA
ER
RWAMWI
LAOGHA
ECU
MMR
CAF
BFA
IDN
CHL
OZEGY
TGO
RUS
TCD
SLE
SOM
TTO
ZMB
NGA
UGA
SYR
BDI
MNG
ETH
GIN
KAZ
MYS
MRT
VENCOD
DZA
IRN
ZE
LBR
ARE
YEM
GAB
SSD
AGO
COGIRQ
QATS U
LBY
KWT
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
SWE
SVN
SEN
JOR
JP
MDG
FRA
MAR
CZEDEU
ESPPOL
GRC
SVK
MDA
ITA
BGDZAF
BGR
NLD
AUT
MOZ
ISR
PHL
LTU
TURHUNTJK
GEO
AFG
CHL
NZL
GTM
H VKGZ
S B
EST
BEN
HA
N RUK
DNK
AK
MNG
GHA
USAGBR
BL
AUS
IND
CIV
BRA
BLZROU
MMR
CODRT
CAN
PER
ARG
CHN
ALB
BOL
COL
SDN
CMRVNM
EX
NOR
MYSBHR
TUN
IDN
RUS
TCD
ECU
EGY
TTO
NGA
KAZ
SYR
VEN
DZAAZE
IRNGAB
SSD
ARE
YEM
AGO
COG
QAT
IRQ
LBY
SAU
KWT
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
Oil rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
COD
TCDNER
NGA
LBRRWA
TJK
GINUGA
SLE
CMR
LAOGAB
CAF
SOM
BDI
BFAENOG
MDGMWI
SDN
ECU
SSDTZA
MLIRT
GHA
GEO
ARG
BEZMB
AFG
PRY
KGZAZE
BLR
A M
PER
DOM
KAZ
AGO
CIVIRQ
MEXGTM
ZMR
VEN
NICCOL
TGO
HTI
ETH
TURHNDS B
ZWE
KA
B A
KENHM
IDN
BGD
XKX
M G
LSO
CRI
MNE
ROU
YEM
MDABOL
UKR
NPL
SAUURYP NTTOSLV
PHL
B A
IRN
N M
CHL
ARE
RUS
ISL
PAK
IND
BTN
P LJAM
IH
TUN
SYR
Q T
SWEDNK
UN
BLZ
NOR
NZL
HRVDZA
ZAF
MAR
BGR
ISRAUS
CZE
BHRKWT
EGYALB
USA
CAN
THA
GBR
MUS
VNM
LBY
SGPMYS
JORCHN
CHE
JPN
LBN HKG
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 50 100 150 200 250
Coal rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
CHE
MDA
BEL
SVN
GRC
ESP
COD
MAR
JP
TUR
SENGHA
CZE
ECU
FRA
ZAF
BSVK
BGRCM
GEO
BIHJO
D U
KGZ
BL
ISR
CHL
AUT
PHL
ITA
IND
AB
IR
AGO
POL
CHNSRB
PER
TJK
TZA
DNK
COL
ALB
AFG
IRQ
MEX
GBR
UN
TUN
NZLAUS
ARG
VNM
SYR
CIV
THA
BGD
HRV
VEN
COG
GA
SA
PAK
KWT
SAU
YEM
EGY
ARE
IDN
NLDCAN
ROU
LBY
IRN
UKR
MYS
KAZ
MOZ
NOR
BOL
DZA
BHR
QAT
AZE
MMR
TTO
RUS
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 1 2 3 4
Natural gas rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
CHE
HRVHKG
BLZ
BEL
KHM
GBR
IRQ
AFG
NLD
CZE
BEN
MWI
LKA
DNK
D U
ITA
TCD
SLV
FRA
JPN
VK
HUN
AUT
BTN
SAU
PAK
NGA
CRI
SYR
LUX
MOZEN
P NESP
GAB
URY
CMR
NOR
CAF
AZET
ISR
ECURO
USA
CYP
G CDZATUR
FIN
EGY
UGA
IR
NPL
HA
A G
NZL
COG
BDI
SWE
GTM
NERTH
VNM
RWA
S BMNE
MDG
CIV
MYS
IRN
COL
MMR
POL
MEX
SDN
VEN
BIH
HT
TUN
INDEO
ALB
CHN
NIC
CAN
SE
XKXRUSHND
JORTJKDNBGR
BRA
TZA
PHLDOM
A MUKR
MAR
BOL
BFA
GHA
BWA
ZAF
ZWE
AUS
KAZ
MLILAO
KGZ
SLENAM
PER
LBR
TGO
JAM
COD
GIN
CHL
MNG
ZMB MRT
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 5 10 15
Mineral rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
ISL
ARE
QAT
KWTBHR
S UGP
HKGAZE
ISR
IRQ
N D
LBN
GBR
SYR
KAZ
KGZTJK
ITA
CHE
GRC
BEL
DNK
JOR
MUS
LUXIRL
YEM
CYPJPN
TTO
D U
DOM
ES
LBY
FRA
VEN
GEO
IRN
USA
ARM
ARG
NOR
HUN
ZA
AUT
SVN
S B
MEX
CAN
SDN
AM
TUN
UKR
CZ
TUR
AUS
P N
MDA
H VMNEP T
POLSVK
AK
COL
PER
AR
EGY
SWE
BGR
R S
LKAB D
AFG
IND
NAM
ROULTUBOLEC
FIN
CHL
IH
BLZ
URY
CHN
B A
THASLV
ALB
LR
ZAF
BWA
PHL
MNG
NZL
GTM
HTIAGO
T
IDN
VA
PLV M
RT
A
NIC
SEN
HNDPRY
ZWE
CRI
CMRGAB
SSD
CIV
ZMBMLIKENCOGKHMM R
LAO
MDG
BTN
LSO
TZA
BEN
GHA
NERTGO
TCD
RWAMWI
BFA
GIN
MOZ
CAF
SLE
MYS
COD
SOM
UGA
BDI
ETH
LBR
3
4
5
6
7
8
0 5 10 15 20
Forest rents (% of GDP)
Life ladder Fitted values
10 
 
4. Robustness checks 
To appreciate the solidity of the relationship between resources rents and happiness, we run 
three main robustness check. The first is for controlling the possible limited nature of the 
dependent variable. The second accounts for the possible variation in the magnitude of the 
interest coefficient depending on the distribution of the dependent variable. The third use 
alternative measures of natural resources dependence. 
4.1 Controlling for the bounded nature of the dependent variable 
As the dependent variable is bounded in [0-10] interval, our results could be biased with OLS 
or another related technique. OLS are also inappropriate with limited dependent variables, for 
which there are a large number of varieties. Sometimes a dependent variable can be continuous 
on one or more intervals of the line of the reals, but can take one or more values with a finite 
probability. Limited dependent variable models are designed to process samples that are 
truncated or censored. To address this bias, some estimators are appropriate. In this paper, we 
run TOBIT, Censored Poisson and Truncated Negative Binomial estimators. These models are 
qualified as count model, because they count the occurrences of an event. Specifically, they 
account for censoring and truncation issues. On one hand, a sample is truncated if some of its 
observations which were to be there were systematically excluded. On the other hand, a sample 
is said to be censored if no observation has been systematically excluded, but if certain 
information contained by these observations has been deleted. These two explanations could be 
the case for the extreme values (0 and 10) of happiness.  
Table 5: Robustness test on the nature of the dependent variable 
 Dependent variable: Life Ladder 
Variables TOBIT   Censored Poisson   Truncated negative binomial 
Total natural resources rents -0.0220*** -0.0246***  -0.00383*** -0.00455***  -0.00391*** -0.00469*** 
 (0.00658) (0.00740)  (0.00119) (0.00138)  (0.00124) (0.00143) 
GDP per capita 0.450*** 0.486***  0.0734*** 0.0843***  0.0743*** 0.0861*** 
 (0.0660) (0.0662)  (0.0122) (0.0128)  (0.0127) (0.0134) 
Population growth -0.108*** -0.0950**  -0.0201*** -0.0186***  -0.0208*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0373)  (0.00602) (0.00652)  (0.00619) (0.00667) 
Inflation -0.000154 -0.000411  -4.61e-06 -7.35e-05  -1.76e-06 -7.61e-05 
 (0.000587) (0.000560)  (0.000120) (0.000141)  (0.000126) (0.000148) 
Health 0.0360*** 0.0198  0.00856*** 0.00445  0.00907*** 0.00468 
 (0.0118) (0.0140)  (0.00245) (0.00294)  (0.00256) (0.00308) 
Unemployment -0.0580*** -0.0555***  -0.0105*** -0.00958***  -0.0109*** -0.00978*** 
 (0.00941) (0.00957)  (0.00184) (0.00187)  (0.00191) (0.00194) 
Education -0.0740 0.231*  -0.0198 0.0356  -0.0212 0.0359 
 (0.125) (0.139)  (0.0260) (0.0253)  (0.0267) (0.0259) 
Constant 0.565 0.353  0.744*** 0.749***  0.705*** 0.716*** 
 (0.399) (0.569)  (0.0931) (0.131)  (0.0978) (0.138) 
Sub-regional dummies No Yes  No Yes  No No 
Observations 123 123  123 123  123 123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.5148 0.5641  0.0512 0.0533  0.0527 0.0549 
Note: Authors' estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010 
The results obtained in Table 5 remain consistent with the previous results: the natural resource 
curse is a worldwide reality. However, the effect seems to be higher with sub-regional dummies, 
the adjustment quality being better under TOBIT model. 
4.2 Resource rents and happiness: a non-parametric approach 
The non-parametric approach used is based on quantile regression (QR). First introduced in 
Koenker and Bassett’s (1978) seminal contribution, the QR method enables us to examine the 
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effects of resource rents at different intervals throughout the happiness index distribution. As 
such, this approach is more robust than OLS for at least two reasons. First while OLS can be 
inefficient if the errors are highly non-normal, QR is more robust to non-normal errors and 
outliers. Second, QR also provides a richer characterization of the data, allowing us to consider 
the impact of a covariate on the entire distribution of the dependent variable, not merely its 
conditional mean3. The quantile estimator is obtained by solving the following optimization 
problem: 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛽𝜖𝑅𝐾 [∑ 𝜃|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽| + ∑ (1 − 𝜃)|𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖′𝛽|𝑖𝜖{𝑖:𝑦𝑖<𝑥𝑖′𝛽}𝑖𝜖{𝑖:𝑦𝑖≥𝑥𝑖′𝛽} ]         (2) 
for the 𝜃𝑡ℎ quantile (0 < 𝜃 < 1). 𝑦𝑖 is the happiness index of country 𝑖. 𝛽 is the vector of parameters to be estimated and 𝑥𝑖 is a 𝐾- 1 vector of the explanatory variables. 
Tableau 7: OLS vs QR 
 
Dependent variable: Life Ladder 
Variables OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 
Total natural resources rents -0.025*** -0.017 -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.012 
 
(0.008) (0.033) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.021) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared  0.828 0.570 0.588 0.638 0.635 0.663 
Oil rents  -0.028*** -0.044** -0.023** -0.026*** -0.024** -0.009 
 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.836 0.576 0.615 0.655 0.660 0.691 
Gas rents  -0.133*** -0.146 -0.071 -0.111 -0.109 -0.269*** 
 
(0.062) (0.107) (0.188) (0.130) (0.069) (0.099) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 74 74 74 74 74 74 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.815 0.507 0.528 0.580 0.601 0.616 
Mineral rents  -0.003 0.017 -0.016 -0.012 -0.036 -0.044 
 
(0.017) (0.085) (0.034) (0.016) (0.031) (0.047) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.811 0.551 0.553 0.609 0.640 0.674 
Forest rents  -0.001 -0.027 -0.033 0.006 0.012 -0.000    
 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.039) (0.032) (0.028) (0.059)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 123 123 123 123 123 123 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.812 0.557 0.573 0.610 0.618 0.656 
Coal rents  0.001 -0.010 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002**  
 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared/pseudo R-squared 0.805 0.520 0.549 0.612 0.623 0.687 
Note: Authors' estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.010 
The results for quantile estimation compared to those of OLS are reported in Table 7. In 
accordance with the methodology used previously, we appreciate the effect on happiness of the 
                                                             
3
 More on quantile regression techniques can be found in the surveys by Buchinsky (1998) and Koenker and 
Hallock (2001); for applications see Coad (2006). 
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total natural resources rents and those of disaggregated resources. Column (1) shows OLS 
estimation results, which suggest that an increase in total resources rents as well as oil rents, 
natural gas rents, forest rents, mineral rents and coal rents significantly reduce wellbeing. 
Columns (2)–(6) report estimates for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles using quantile 
regression. 
We observe that negative effect of total resource rent varies throughout the happiness 
distribution. More specifically, effect is statically significant from the 25th quantile up to the 
75th, beyond which the effect tends to be no longer significant. Regarding disaggregated 
resources, we find that while oil rents negatively influences happiness at the bottom of its 
distribution up to the 75th quantile, gas rents influences it only from 95th quantile, i.e. at an 
extremely high level of happiness. Likewise, coal rents which initially had no significant effect 
with the OLS approach, also had a negative effect on happiness from 95th quartile. 
These results are confirmed on the Figure 3 which illustrates how the effects of resources rents 
on happiness vary over quantiles, and how the magnitude of the effects at various quantiles 
differ considerably from the OLS coefficient (presented as horizontal lines). We observe that 
when the QR is evaluated before the median happiness index (i.e. before the 50th quantile), the 
total of resource rents seem to have a positive influence on happiness. However, for quantiles 
over the 50th, the effect tends to be negative. Thus, countries which have few natural resources 
apply the best management mechanisms compared to countries which are highly endowed with 
them. Thus, the thesis of the curse of raw materials is verified according to the level of happiness 
and to the type of natural resource in the world. 
Figure 3: The magnitude of the resources rent effects on happiness over the quantiles 
Source: Authors’ constructions using data of WDI and WHS. Horizontal lines represent OLS 
estimates with 95% confidence intervals. 
4.3 Alternative measures of natural resource dependence and happiness 
In this robustness analysis, we use other measures of natural resource dependence, namely: (i) 
the share of primary exports in total exports (see Sachs and Warner, 1995; Leite and Weidmann, 
1999) calculated according to Standard International Trade Classification Rev. 3 (SITC 
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categories 0, 1, 2, 3 and 68); (ii) the share of exports of metals and ores on the total exports (see 
Danielle, 2011). 
Table 6: Other measures of natural resource dependence and happiness  
 Dependent variable: Life Ladder 
 OLS Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q95 
Primary exports/Total exports -0.867*** -1.047* -0.283 -0.946* -0.953* 0.0171 
 (0.331) (0.553) (0.458) (0.496) (0.489) (0.703) 
Constant 5.741*** 4.499*** 4.572*** 5.662*** 6.608*** 7.311*** 
 (0.200) (0.329) (0.272) (0.294) (0.290) (0.417) 
Number of countries 125 125 125 125 125 125 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.0075 0.0106 0.0337 0.0286 0.0000 
Exports of metals and minerals /Total exports -0.0148*** -0.00929 -0.00988 -0.0160* -0.0183** -0.0162** 
 (0.00425) (0.00959) (0.00815) (0.00817) (0.00801) (0.00784) 
Constant 5.545*** 4.143*** 4.667*** 5.588*** 6.377*** 7.487*** 
 (0.108) (0.192) (0.163) (0.163) (0.160) (0.157) 
Number of countries 147 147 147 147 147 147 
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.0073 0.0084 0.0389 0.0413 0.0198 
Note: Authors' estimates. Results based on OLS and QR. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p 
< 0.010 
Overall, the use of alternative measures of dependence on natural resources confirms the thesis 
of the curse, but dependence is higher for primary products than for metals. These results are in 
line with those of Davis (1995), Mikesell (1997), Auty and Mikesell (1998), Auty (2001), 
Berman et al. (2017), Apergis and Katsaiti (2018) using other economic variables than 
happiness. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
The aim of this paper was to study the effects of resource rents on subjective wellbeing. Based 
on data covering 149 cross-countries and using both parametric and non-parametric approaches, 
we highlighted the existence of resource curse on subjective wellbeing. Specifically, we found 
that resources rents tend to reduce happiness but this effect differs depending on the political 
system and the level of development, the types of natural resources and varies according to the 
level of happiness. Indeed, studying heterogeneity of results across countries, we found that the 
negative effect of natural resources on happiness tends to be amplified in developing and weak 
democracy countries. Furthermore, the disaggregation of natural resources rents show that 
while oil rents and natural gas rent have a significant negative effect, forest, coal and mineral 
rents do not. These results remain globally robust when we use the other measures relating to 
dependence on natural resources such as the share of primary exports in total exports and the 
share of exports of metals and minerals on the total exports. This solid and negative average 
effect of natural resources on happiness was obtained by parametric approaches. To put our 
result into perspective, we used a non-parametric approach by retaining the quantile regression 
technique. The results suggest that, the negative effect of natural resources on happiness vary 
at different intervals throughout the happiness distribution. So, as noted by Badeeb et al. (2017) 
in their survey, “the evidence that resource dependence negatively affects growth remains 
convincing, particularly working through factors closely associated with growth in developing 
countries”. 
These results suggest the formulation of three main recommendations: (i) first, it is fundamental 
to diversify the productive structure of economies to counteract the curse of natural resources. 
With this in mind, countries should reflect on their transition from the status of rent economies 
to that of production economies. To this end, it is a matter of promoting a diversified productive 
base, with an important industrial sector, a vector of structural transformation; (ii) second, 
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countries should build strong institutions to avoid rent-seeking and survival behavior. Better 
quality institutions are the key to a prosperous economy, in that they shape behavior, guarantee 
equity, a vector for combating inequality and conflict in resource-rich countries; (iii) third, 
governments should promote a system of optimal allocation of resources through targeting and 
redistribution mechanisms that reduce injustice and inequalities.  
References 
Alexeev, M., Conrad, R. (2009). The elusive curse of oil. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
91(3), 586-598. 
Ali, S., Murshed, S. M., Papyrakis, E. (2020). Happiness and the resource curse. Journal of Happiness 
Studies, 21(2), 437-464. 
Apergis, N., Katsaiti, M. S. (2018). Poverty and the resource curse: evidence from a global panel of 
countries. Research in Economics, 72(2), 211-223. 
Arezki, M. R., van der Ploeg, F. (2007). Can the Natural Resource Curse Be Turned Into a Blessing? 
The Role of Trade Policies and Institutions (EPub) (No. 7-55). International Monetary Fund. 
Atkinson, G., Hamilton, K. (2003). Savings, growth and the resource curse hypothesis. World 
development, 31(11), 1793-1807. 
Auty, R. M. (1994). Industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing countries: The resource 
curse thesis. World development, 22(1), 11-26. 
Auty, R., Warhurst, A. (1993). Sustainable development in mineral exporting economies. 
Resources Policy, 19(1), 14-29. 
Baggio, J. A., Papyrakis, E. (2010). Ethnic diversity, property rights, and natural resources. The 
Developing Economies, 48(4), 473-495. 
Behbudi, D., Mamipour, S., Karami, A. (2010). Natural resource abundance, human capital and 
economic growth in the petroleum exporting countries. Journal of Economic Development, 35(3), 
81. 
Berman, N., Couttenier, M., Rohner, D., Thoenig, M. (2017). This mine is mine! How minerals fuel 
conflicts in Africa. American Economic Review, 107(6), 1564-1610. 
Bhattacharyya, S., Hodler, R. (2010). Natural resources, democracy and corruption. European Economic 
Review, 54(4), 608-621. 
Boos, A., Holm-Müller, K. (2013). The relationship between the resource curse and genuine savings: 
Empirical evidence. Journal of Sustainable Development, 6(6), 59. 
Boschini, A., Pettersson, J., Roine, J. (2013). The resource curse and its potential reversal. World 
Development, 43, 19-41. 
Boyce, J. R., Emery, J. H. (2011). Is a negative correlation between resource abundance and growth 
sufficient evidence that there is a “resource curse”? Resources Policy, 36(1), 1-13. 
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., Tabellini, G. (2013). The political resource curse. American 
Economic Review, 103(5), 1759-96. 
Brunnschweiler, C. N. (2008). Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and 
economic growth. World development, 36(3), 399-419. 
Brunnschweiler, C. N., Bulte, E. H. (2008). The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes 
and red herrings. Journal of environmental economics and management, 55(3), 248-264. 
Bulte, E. H., Damania, R., Deacon, R. T. (2005). Resource intensity, institutions, and development. 
World development, 33(7), 1029-1044. 
Carmignani, F., Avom, D. (2010). The social development effects of primary commodity export 
dependence. Ecological Economics, 70(2), 317-330. 
Cavalcanti, T. V. D. V., Mohaddes, K., Raissi, M. (2011). Growth, development and natural resources: 
New evidence using a heterogeneous panel analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, 51(4), 305-318. 
Chen, W. C. (2012). How education enhances happiness: Comparison of mediating factors in four East 
Asian countries. Social indicators research, 106(1), 117-131. 
Cockx, L., Francken, N. (2016). Natural resources: A curse on education spending? Energy Policy, 92, 
394-408. 
15 
 
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford economic papers, 56(4), 563-
595. 
Corden, W. M. (1984). Booming sector and Dutch disease economics: Survey and consolidation. Oxford 
Economic Papers, Vol. 36: 359–80. 
Corden. W. M., Neary, J. P. (1982). Booming sector and Dutch disease economics: A survey. The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 92. 
Cuñado, J., de Gracia, F. P. (2012). Does education affect happiness? Evidence for Spain. Social 
indicators research, 108(1), 185-196. 
Daniele, V. (2011). Natural resources and the quality of economic development. the Journal of 
Development studies, 47(4), 545-573. 
Davis, G. A. (1995). Learning to love the Dutch disease: Evidence from the mineral economies. World 
development, 23(10), 1765-1779. 
Davis, G. A., Tilton, J. E. (2008). Why the resource curse is a concern. Mining Engineering, 60(4), 29-
32. 
Davis, G.A., Tilton, J.E., 2005. The resource curse. In: Natural Resources Forum, 29. Blackwell 
Publishing, Ltd, Oxford, UK, pp. 233–242. 
De Medeiros Costa, H. K., dos Santos, E. M. (2013). Institutional analysis and the “resource curse” in 
developing countries. Energy Policy, 63, 788-795. 
Di John, J. (2007). Oil abundance and violent political conflict: A critical assessment. The Journal of 
Development Studies, 43(6), 961-986. 
Di Tella, R., MacCulloch, R. J., Oswald, A. J. (2001). Preferences over inflation and unemployment: 
Evidence from surveys of happiness. American economic review, 91(1), 335-341. 
Dietz, S., Neumayer, E., De Soysa, I. (2007). Corruption, the resource curse and genuine saving. 
Environment and Development Economics, 12(1), 33-53. 
Easterlin, R. A. (2004). The economics of happiness. Daedalus, 133(2), 26-33. 
Ebeke, C., Omgba, L. D., Laajaj, R. (2015). Oil, governance and the (mis) allocation of talent in 
developing countries. Journal of Development Economics, 114, 126-141. 
Eregha, P. B., Mesagan, E. P. (2016). Oil resource abundance, institutions and growth: Evidence from 
oil producing African countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 38(3), 603-619. 
Fearon, J. D. (2005). Primary commodity exports and civil war. Journal of conflict Resolution, 49(4), 
483-507. 
Fields, G. (1989). Change in poverty and inequality in the developing countries. World Bank Research 
Observer, 4(2): 167–85. 
Frankel, J. A. (2010). The natural resource curse: a survey (No. w15836). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Frey, B. S., Stutzer, A. (2002). What can economists learn from happiness research? Journal of 
Economic literature, 40(2), 402-435. 
Gelb, A. H. (1988). Oil windfalls: Blessing or curse? Oxford university press. 
Gregoire, T. G., Valentine, H. T. (2007). Sampling strategies for natural resources and the environment. 
CRC Press. 
Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European economic 
review, 45(4-6), 847-859. 
Haber, S., Menaldo, V. (2011). Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource 
curse. American political science Review, 105(1), 1-26. 
Helliwell, J. F., Huang, H., Grover, S., Wang, S. (2018). Empirical linkages between good governance 
and national well-being. Journal of Comparative Economics, 46(4), 1332-1346. 
Hodler, R. (2006). The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries. European Economic 
Review, 50(6), 1367-1386. 
Iimi, A. (2007). Escaping from the Resource Curse: Evidence from Botswana and the Rest of the World. 
IMF Staff Papers, 54(4), 663-699. 
Isham, J., Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., Busby, G., (2005). The varieties of resource experience: natural 
resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth. World Bank Economic 
Review 19, 141-174. 
James, A., 2015b. The resource curse: a statistical mirage? J. Dev. Econ. 114, 55–63. 
16 
 
Karl, T. L. (1997). The paradox of plenty: Oil booms and petro-states (Vol. 26). Univ of California 
Press. 
Koenker, R., Bassett Jr, G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric 
Society, 33-50. 
Kolstad, I., Wiig, A. (2009). Is transparency the key to reducing corruption in resource-rich countries? 
World development, 37(3), 521-532. 
Krueger, A.O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. Am. Econ. Rev. 64 (3), 291–
303. 
Krugman, P. (1987). The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the competitive 
consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale 
economies. Journal of development Economics, 27(1-2), 41-55. 
Kula, E. (2012). Economics of natural resources, the environment and policies. Springer Science  
Business Media. 
Le Billon, P. (2003). Fuelling war: Natural resources and armed conflct. Adelphi Papers, Vol. 357 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Le Billon. P. (2005). The Geo-politics of Resource Wars (London: Routledge). 
Lederman, D. Maloney, W. F. (2007). Natural Resources: Neither Curse Nor Destiny (Washington, DC: 
World Bank and Stanford University Press). 
Lederman, D., Maloney, W. F. (2003). Trade structure and growth. The World Bank. 
Leite, M. C., Weidmann, J. (1999). Does mother nature corrupt: Natural resources, corruption, and 
economic growth. International Monetary Fund. 
Makhlouf, Y., Kellard, N. M., Vinogradov, D. (2017). Child mortality, commodity price volatility and 
the resource curse. Social Science Medicine, 178, 144-156. 
Marshall, M. G., Jagger, K.,  Gurr, T. R. (2009). Polity IV: Regime authority characteristics and 
transition datasets, 1800-2009 [Data file]. Available on-line at http://www. systemicpeace. 
org/inscr/inscr. htm Last Accessed, 10(10). 
Medeiros Costa, H. K., dos Santos, E. M. (2013). Institutional analysis and the “resource curse” in 
developing countries, Energy Policy, 63, pp. 788-795. 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., Torvik, R. (2006). Institutions and the resource curse. The economic 
journal, 116(508), 1-20. 
Mikesell, R. F. (1997). Explaining the resource curse, with special reference to mineral-exporting 
countries. Resources Policy, 23(4), 191-199. 
Mosley, P. (2017). Fiscal policy and the natural resources curse: How to escape from the poverty trap. 
Taylor Francis. 
Ross, M. (2001). How does natural resource wealth influence civil war? University of California at Los 
Angeles Political Science Department, Los Angeles. Available online at: http://www. eireview. 
org/. Processed. 
Ross, M. (2012). The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press). 
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. (1999). Natural resource intensity and economic growth. Development 
policies in natural resource economies, 13-38. 
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. M. (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth (No. 
w5398). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Sachs, J. D., Warner, A. M. (2001). The curse of natural resources. European economic review, 
45(4-6), 827-838. 
Sala-i-Martin, X. Subramanian, A (2003). Addressing [the natural resource curse: An illustration from 
Nigeria. NBER Working Paper 9804. 
Sala-i-Martin, X., Doppelhoffer, G., Miller, R. (2001). Cross-Sectional Growth Regressions: 
Robustness and Bayesian Model Averaging. Columbia University. Mimeographed. 
Santos, R. J. (2018). Blessing and curse. The gold boom and local development in Colombia. World 
Development, 106, 337–355. 
Segal, P. (2011). Resource rents, redistribution, and halving global poverty: the resource dividend. 
World Development, 39(4), 475-489. 
17 
 
Stevens, P., Dietsche, E., 2008. Resource curse: an analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways 
forward. Energy Policy 36, 56–65. 
Tollison, R.D., 1982. Rent seeking: a survey. Kyklos 35 (4), 575–602. 
Tsui, K. K. (2011). More oil, less democracy: Evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries. The 
Economic Journal, 121(551), 89-115. 
Van der Ploeg, F., Poelhekke, S. (2009). Volatility and the natural resource curse. Oxford economic 
papers, 61(4), 727-760. 
Van Der Ploeg, F., Poelhekke, S. (2017). The impact of natural resources: Survey of recent quantitative 
evidence. The Journal of Development Studies, 53(2), 205-216. 
Van Wijnbergen, S. (1984a). The Dutch disease: A disease after all? The Economic Journal, Vol. 94: 
41–55.  
Van Wijnbergen, S. (1984b). Inflation, unemployment and the Dutch disease in oil-exporting countries: 
A short-run dis-equilibrium analysis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99: 233–50. 
Wright, G., Czelusta, J. (2004). Why economies slow: the myth of the resource curse. Challenge, 47(2), 
6-38. 
Appendix 
Table A1: list of countries by sub-regions, level of development and democratization. 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Middle East 
North Africa 
South 
Asia 
North 
America 
Europe 
Central Asia 
East 
Asia Pacific 
Latin America 
Caribbean 
Angola Algeria (a) Afghanistan Canada (ab) Albania (ab) Austria (ab) Argentina (ab) 
Benin Bahrain (a) Bangladesh USA (a) Armenia (ab) Cambodia Belize (a) 
Botswana (ab) Egypt Bhutan 
 
Austria (a) China (a) Bolivia 
Burkina Faso Iran (a) India 
 
Azerbaijan (a) Hong Kong Brazil (ab) 
Burundi Iraq (ab) Nepal 
 
Belarus (a) Indonesia Chile (ab) 
Cameroon Israel (ab) Pakistan 
 
Belgium Japan (ab) Colombia (ab) 
Central African R. Jordan (a) Sri Lanka (ab) 
 
Bosnia Lao PDR Costa Rica (a) 
Chad Kuwait (a) 
  
Bulgaria (ab) Malaysia (ab) Dominican Rep. (ab) 
Congo, D. Rep. Lebanon (ab) 
  
Croatia (ab) Mongolia Ecuador (a) 
Congo, Rep. Libya (a) 
  
Cyprus (ab) Myanmar El Salvador 
Cote d'Ivoire Malta (a) 
  
Czech Rep. (ab) N. Zealand (ab) Guatemala (ab) 
Ethiopia Morocco 
  
Denmark (ab) Philippines Haiti 
Gabon (a) Qatar (a) 
  
Estonia (ab) Singapore (a) Honduras 
Ghana Saudi Arabia (a) 
  
Finland (ab) Thailand (a) Jamaica (ab) 
Guinea Syrian Arab R. 
  
France (ab) Vietnam Mexico (ab) 
Kenya United Arab E. (a) 
  
Georgia (ab) 
 
Netherlands (ab) 
Lesotho Yemen, Rep. 
  
Germany (ab) 
 
Nicaragua 
Liberia 
   
Greece (ab) 
 
Panama (ab) 
Malawi 
   
Iceland (a) 
 
Paraguay (ab) 
Mali    Ireland (ab)  Peru (ab) 
Mauritania (a) 
   
Italy (ab) 
 
Trinidad (ab) 
Mauritius 
   
Kazakhstan (a) 
 
Uruguay (ab) 
Mozambique 
   
Kosovo (ab) 
 
Venezuela 
Namibia (ab) 
   
Latvia (ab) 
  
Niger 
   
Lithuania (ab) 
  
Nigeria 
   
Luxembourg (ab) 
  
Rwanda 
   
Montenegro (ab) 
  
Senegal 
   
Norway (ab) 
  
Sierra Leone 
   
Poland (ab) 
  
Somalia 
   
Portugal (ab) 
  
South Africa (ab) 
   
Romania (ab) 
  
South Sudan 
   
Russian (a) 
  
Tanzania 
   
Serbia (ab) 
  
Togo 
   
Slovak Rep. (ab) 
  
Uganda 
   
Slovenia (ab) 
  
Zambia 
   
Spain (ab) 
  
Zimbabwe (a) 
   
Sweden (ab) 
  
    
Switzerland (ab) 
  
    Uzbekistan (a)   
Note: authors’ construction. (a) denotes developed country, (b) denotes democratic country and (ab) denotes both developed and 
democratic country. 
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Table A2: correlation matrix table 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Happiness index 1 
      
 
(2) Total natural resources rents -0.27 1 
     
 
(3) GDP per capita 0.82 -0.11 1 
    
 
(4) Population growth 0.11 -0.35 0.11 1 
   
 
(5) Inflation -0.09 0.13 -0.08 -0.14 1 
  
 
(6) Health 0.80 -0.34 0.86 0.28 -0.11 1 
 
 
(7) Employment -0.13 0.08 -0.28 -0.01 0.04 -0.33 1  
(8) Education 0.08 -0.12 0.19 0.56 0.01 0.32 0.43 1 
Note: Authors’ calculations.  
Table A3: Diagnostic tests for OLS (normality, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and 
omitted variables) 
1. Normality test: Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
Variable Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
residual 123 0.0995                0.8324         2.82          0.2445 
 
2. Heteroskedasticity test: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of life ladder 
chi2(1)      =     1.11 
Prob > chi2  =   0.2929 
 
3. Multicollinearity test 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Health 6.54 0.152 
GDP per capita 4.75 0.210 
Human capita 3.27 0.306 
Total resource rents 1.50 0.667 
Population growth 1.32 0.761 
Unemployment 1.10 0.905 
Inflation 1.08 0.923 
Mean VIF 2.79  
    
3. Omitted variables test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of LL 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 112) =      1.58 
Prob > F =      0.1981 
Note: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
